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Abstract
In the Eisert protocol for 2×2 quantum games [Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077], a number
of authors have investigated the features arising from making the strategic space a
two-parameter subset of single qubit unitary operators. We argue that the new Nash
equilibria and the classical-quantum transitions that occur are simply an artifact of
the particular strategy space chosen. By choosing a different, but equally plausible,
two-parameter strategic space we show that different Nash equilibria with different
classical-quantum transitions can arise. We generalize the two-parameter strategies
and also consider these strategies in a multiplayer setting.
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1 Introduction
The intersection of the mathematical theory of strategic conflict situations,
known as game theory, and the tools of quantum mechanics was first made by
Jens Eisert and co-workers [1] and by David Meyer [2]. Since then a body of
theory on quantum games has built up. The original protocol for two-player,
two-strategy (2 × 2) quantum games, introduced by Eisert et al. [1,3], has
remained the main tool for exploring the properties of quantum games. In
this, the players moves are quantum operators acting on qubits, with non-
classical effects being introduced through entanglement.
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In the seminal paper [1] and a number of subsequent publications [4,5,6,7,8,9,10]
a particular two-parameter subset of SU(2) is chosen as the strategic space for
the players. This has the advantage of mathematical simplicity and, in addi-
tion, new Nash equilibria appear that are able to solve some of the dilemmas
of classical game theory. For example, in the well known game of Prisoners’
Dilemma [11] there is a conflict between the Nash equilibrium (NE), that de-
termines the strategies that two self-interested rational players would choose
to maximize their payoffs, and the Pareto efficient outcome, that is the best
overall for the players. With the commonly used two-parameter strategy space
in the Eisert protocol this dilemma is resolved with a new NE appearing that
coincides with the Pareto optimal (PO) outcome [1]. Subsequent investiga-
tions revealed three regions in the space of the entangling parameter: when
the entanglement is greatest there is a quantum region with the new NE, at
minimal entanglements the game behaves classically, and between these there
is a classical-quantum region with intermediate behaviour [12,13].
It was quickly observed by Benjamin and Hayden [14] that the two-parameter
strategies were not the most general, and suffer from being incomplete under
composition. Three parameters are necessary to describe (up to an arbitrary
phase) a general SU(2) operator, and in the full three-parameter strategy
space there is no NE in deterministic quantum strategies [14]. Nash equi-
libria in mixed quantum strategies exist, that is, in linear combinations of
unitaries [3,15]. However, among these a different dilemma arises: they form
a continuous set and the arrival at a unique NE may be problematic. In addi-
tion, in Prisoners’ Dilemma, the payoff from the mixed quantum NE, though
superior to that from the classical NE, is still worse than the PO outcome.
This Letter demonstrates that a different, but equally justifiable, two-parameter
strategic space can give rise to different NE with different classical-quantum
transitions. This result supports the position that the new NE and the classical-
quantum boundaries to which they give rise are nothing but artifacts of the
particular choice of sub-space. Indeed, though it is easy to see why allowable
choices of the players may be limited by unitarity, since this gives the set of
reversible quantum operators, rather than the space of all possible quantum
operations, it is difficult to see a physical justification for the use of two-
parameter strategies, in particular the preference of one two-parameter set
over another.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the results for the
existing two-parameter strategies for the game of Prisoners’ Dilemma as well
as presenting new results for the games of Chicken and Battle of the Sexes. In
section 3 we present an alternative two-parameter strategy space and consider
the three games again, showing quite different behaviour. In section 4 we
generalize the results for Prisoners’ Dilemma to N players and in section 5 we
consider two-player games with generalized two-parameter strategy spaces.
2
2 Summary of the Eisert protocol and results for the existing two-
parameter strategies
There have been many papers summarizing the Eisert protocol for 2×2 quan-
tum games so it shall be described here as briefly as possible. For a more
detailed description see, for example, Ref. [15].
The players’ choice is encoded in a qubit, initially prepared in the |0〉 state.
An operator Jˆ , dependent on a parameter γ ∈ [0, pi/2],
Jˆ = cos
γ
2
Iˆ ⊗ Iˆ + i sin γ
2
σˆx ⊗ σˆx, (1)
entangles the players’ qubits to produce the state (|00〉+ i|11〉)/√2. The play-
ers’ strategies are the choice of local operator that they now make to act on
their qubit. The space of allowable operators forms the strategic space of the
players. Because of the entanglement, the actions of the players are not inde-
pendent. The two classical pure strategies are represented by Iˆ and iσˆx. After
the players’ moves Jˆ† is applied to the pair of qubits with the consequence
that if both players choose classical strategies the result is entirely equivalent
to the classical game. Finally, a measurement is made in the computational
basis and payoffs are awarded using the classical payoff matrix. The state of
the players’ qubits prior to the final measurement can be computed by
|ψf 〉 = Jˆ†(Aˆ⊗ Bˆ)Jˆ |ψi〉, (2)
where Aˆ and Bˆ represent Alice’s and Bob’s moves, respectively. We are inter-
ested in the expectation value 〈$〉 of the players’ payoffs. This can be calculated
by
〈$〉 = $00|〈ψf |00〉|2 + $01|〈ψf |01〉|2 + $10|〈ψf |10〉|2 + $11|〈ψf |11〉|2, (3)
where $ij is the payoff to the player associated with the game outcome ij, i, j ∈
{0, 1}.
The two parameter quantum strategies of Eisert et al. [1] are drawn from the
set 1
S(1)= {Mˆ (1)(θ, φ) : θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈ [0, pi/2]}, (4)
1 There are some notational differences with Ref. [1] but these are of no significance.
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Mˆ (1)(θ, φ)=

 e
iφ cos(θ/2) i sin(θ/2)
i sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)

 .
A possible parameterization of the full space of SU(2) operators is
Mˆ(θ, α, β) =

 e
iα cos(θ/2) ieiβ sin(θ/2)
ie−iβ sin(θ/2) e−iα cos(θ/2)

 , (5)
where θ ∈ [0, pi] and α, β ∈ [−pi, pi]. If we use the latter set for the strate-
gic space any operation carried out by one player can be reversed by the
other. Consequently any strategy has a counter-strategy [3,14,15]. Pure strat-
egy equilibria in the quantum game will only arise when the classical game,
from which it is derived, has a purely co-operative solution. Such games are of
little interest to game theory and, alas, generally do not model any real world
situations either!
The two-parameter strategic space of Eq. (4) can give rise to interesting prop-
erties. As an example consider the famous Prisoners’ Dilemma [11]. Here the
players’ moves are known as cooperation (C) or defection (D). The payoff
matrix can be written as
Bob : C Bob : D
Alice : C (3, 3) (0, 5)
Alice : D (5, 0) (1, 1)
(6)
where the numbers in parentheses represent payoffs to Alice and Bob, respec-
tively. The game is symmetric and there is a dominant strategy, that of always
defecting, since it gives a better payoff regardless of the actions of the other
player. The Nash equilibrium is D⊗D since from this outcome neither player
can improve their payoff by a unilateral change in strategy. However, D ⊗D
is not such a good result for the players since had they both cooperated they
would have both received a payoff of three rather than one. The outcome
C ⊗ C is the PO result, the one from which neither player can improve their
payoff without the other being worse off. It is this conflict between the NE
and PO outcomes that forms the dilemma of the game’s name. In social and
political life this dilemma between individual and group rationality is respon-
sible for much of the conflict throughout the world. In the quantum version of
this game the strategy “always cooperate” is represented by Iˆ, while “always
defect” is represented by iσˆx. With maximal entanglement, γ = pi/2, a new
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strategy
Cˆ ′ = Mˆ(0, pi/2) =

 i 0
0 −i

 (7)
emerges as the preferred strategy for both players 2 , with the NE being Cˆ ′⊗Cˆ ′.
The new NE gives an expected payoff of three to both players there by breaking
the dilemma. The situation for non-maximal entanglement is described by Du
et al. [12]. Once sin2 γ slips below 2
5
, Cˆ ′ ⊗ Cˆ ′ is no longer a NE. Instead, two
new asymmetric NE emerge, Cˆ ′⊗Dˆ and Dˆ⊗Cˆ ′, with a payoff of 5 sin2 γ to the
player choosing Cˆ ′ and 5 cos2 γ to the defecting player. Finally, for sin2 γ < 1
5
the game behaves classically with a NE of Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ. These regimes and their
corresponding payoffs are indicated in figure 1. In the intermediate region, the
existence of a pair of asymmetric NE each favouring one player over the other
presents a dilemma equivalent to that found in the classical game of Chicken:
How do the players arrive at a unique solution?
Chicken is similar to Prisoners’ Dilemma except that mutual defection is the
worst outcome:
Bob : C Bob : D
Alice : C (3, 3) (1, 4)
Alice : D (4, 1) (0, 0)
(8)
The classical game has two NE in pure strategies, C ⊗D and D⊗C, both of
which are unsatisfactory for the cooperating player in comparison with the PO
outcome of C⊗C. A quantum version of this game have been considered in the
Eisert protocol [3] and some of its features have been examined [17]. With the
two parameter strategy set, the effect on the NE of varying the entanglement
parameter has not previously been published, though it follows the pattern
of Prisoners’ Dilemma. With sin2 γ ≥ 1
3
the strategy profile Cˆ ′ ⊗ Cˆ ′ is again
a NE with payoffs of three to both players. For 0 < sin2 γ ≤ 1
3
, Cˆ ′ ⊗ Dˆ and
Dˆ⊗ Cˆ ′ are NE with payoffs of 4− 3 sin2 γ to the Cˆ ′ player and 1 + 3 sin2 γ to
the defector. As γ → 0 these strategy profiles become equivalent to the two
classical NE, as indicated in figure 2.
Another favourite dilemma of game theorists, and one studied in a number of
quantum game papers [17,18,19,20] is the Battle of the Sexes, where a couple
each have a preferred activity but are trying to coordinate their actions in
2 In Ref. [1] the strategy Cˆ ′ is called Qˆ.
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the absence of communication. Alice wants to go to the opera (O) while Bob
prefers to watch television (T ). The payoff matrix is
Bob : O Bob : T
Alice : O (2, 1) (0, 0)
Alice : T (0, 0) (1, 2)
(9)
The classical game has two NE solutions, O ⊗ O and T ⊗ T . The dilemma is
similar to that in Chicken since there is no way to coordinate the decisions
of the players and arrive at a unique NE. If the players choose differently the
worst possible result for both players is obtained. The effect of using the two-
parameter strategy set S(1) in this game has not previously been considered.
If Alice plays Mˆ (1)(θA, φA) while Bob plays Mˆ
(1)(θB, φB), the probability of
the outcome OO is
pOO = [cos
2 γ sin2(φA + φB) + cos
2(φA + φB)] c
2
Ac
2
B, (10)
while the probability of TT is
pTT =sin
2 γ sin2(φA + φB) c
2
Ac
2
B + s
2
As
2
B (11)
− 1
2
sin γ sin θA sin θB sin(φA + φB),
where sk ≡ sin(θk/2), ck ≡ cos(θk/2), k ∈ {A,B}. If θA = 0, that is, Alice tries
to choose her favourite activity of Opera, then Bob’s expected payoff is
〈$B〉 = cos2 θB [1 + sin2 γ sin2(φA + φB)]. (12)
Hence, as with the classical scenario, Bob will want to coordinate his selection
of θ with Alice’s by setting θB = 0. However, for any φA chosen by Alice, Bob
can always select φB = pi/2− φA to give payoffs of
〈$A〉 = 2− sin2 γ; (13)
〈$B〉 = 1 + sin2 γ.
For γ > pi/4 such a result favours Bob over Alice. Conversely, if Bob plays
Mˆ (1)(0, φB) Alice’s expected payoff is
〈$A〉 = cos2 θA [2 − sin2 γ sin2(φA + φB)]. (14)
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Hence Alice will counter with Mˆ (1)(0, pi − φB) to ensure a payoff of two com-
pared with one for Bob. With the restriction in Eq (4) of 0 ≤ φ ≤ pi/2 the
best she can be guaranteed of achieving is sin2(φA + φB) ≤ 12 , resulting in
〈$A〉 ≥ 2− 1
2
sin2 γ; (15)
〈$B〉 ≤ 1 + 1
2
sin2 γ.
There is no equilibrium with θA = θB = 0 since every φ chosen by one party
has an optimal counter by the other.
A cursory examination of Eqs. (10) and (11) reveal that for θB = pi the phases
φA and φB are not relevant to the payoffs of Alice or Bob. The result is a
purely classical NE of Tˆ ⊗ Tˆ , where Tˆ = Mˆ (1)(pi, φ) for arbitrary φ. That is,
we have started with a symmetric game and by our choice of strategic space we
have a unique NE with asymmetric payoffs! This is evidence that the strategy
set S(1) has an inherent bias, an observation that has not been made before.
Further indications of this bias are presented in the next section.
3 Alternate two-parameter strategy sets
To the present authors there seems no reason not to put the two-parameter
strategy set
S(2)= {M(θ, φ) : θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈ [0, pi/2]}, (16)
Mˆ (2)(θ, φ)=

 cos(θ/2) ie
iφ sin(θ/2)
ie−iφ sin(θ/2) cos(θ/2)

 ,
on an equal footing to S(1). This strategic space has already been used to
explore the NE payoff versus entanglement relationship in two and three player
Prisoners’ Dilemma [16] but the authors did not comment on the difference
between their results and earlier ones for two player Prisoners’ Dilemma [12,13]
found using the strategy space of S(1). We now explore the consequences of this
choice of strategic space on the equilibria of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken
and the Battle of the Sexes. The results for the Prisoners’ Dilemma are the
equivalent, up to a minor notational change in Eq. (16), to those given in
Ref. [16].
If Alice plays Mˆ (2)(θA, φA) and Bob Mˆ
(2)(θB, φB), the probability of the four
possible outcomes of a 2× 2 quantum game in the Eisert protocol are
7
pCC =sin
2 γ sin2(φA + φB) s
2
As
2
B + c
2
Ac
2
B (17)
+
1
2
sin γ sin θA sin θB sin(φA + φB),
pCD = [cos
2 γ sin2 φB + cos
2 φB]c
2
As
2
B + sin
2 γ sin2 φA s
2
Ac
2
B
− 1
2
sin γ sin θA sin θB sin φA cosφB,
pDC = [cos
2 γ sin2 φA + cos
2 φA] s
2
Ac
2
B + sin
2 γ sin2 φB c
2
As
2
B
− 1
2
sin γ sin θA sin θB cos φA sinφB,
pDD = [cos
2 γ sin2(φA + φB) + cos
2(φA + φB)] s
2
As
2
B.
The equivalent to Cˆ ′ in the new strategy space is
Dˆ′ ≡ Mˆ (2)(pi, pi/4) = 1√
2

 0 i− 1
i+ 1 0

 . (18)
Consider the expected payoffs when Bob playsM (1)(θ, φ) while Alice plays Dˆ′:
〈$〉=$CC sin2 θ
2
sin2 γ (1 − sin 2φ)/2 (19)
+ $CD cos
2 θ
2
(sin2 γ)/2
+ $DC cos
2 θ
2
[
1 − 1
2
sin2 γ
]
+ $DD sin
2 θ
2
[
1 − 1
2
sin2 γ (1 + sin 2φ)
]
.
For the Prisoners’ Dilemma payoffs of Eq. (6), Bob maximizes his results for
all γ by setting θ = φ and φ = pi/4. Thus Dˆ′ ⊗ Dˆ′ is a symmetric NE for all
γ with
〈$A〉 = 〈$B〉 = 1 + 2 sin2 γ. (20)
The payoff is superior to that of the classical NE of Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ provided γ > 0,
as indicated in figure 1. The NE is not strict since there is some flexibility in
the allowable values of φ. The permitted values of φA, φB are those for which
φA + φB = pi/2 and both φ satisfy
3 sin2 γ − 1
5 sin2 γ
< sin2 φ <
2 sin2 γ + 1
5 sin2 γ
. (21)
However, φA = φB = pi/4 is a focal point [21] that will attract the players for
psychological reasons.
8
✲✻
sin2 γ
〈$〉
1
5
2
5
1
1
3
5
 
 
 
 
❅
❅
❅
❅
✦
✦
✦
✦
✦
✦
✦
✦
Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ
Dˆ ⊗ Cˆ ′
Cˆ ′ ⊗ Cˆ ′
Dˆ′ ⊗ Dˆ′
✛ defector
✛ cooperator
Fig. 1. The Nash equilibrium payoffs in a quantum version of Prisoners’ Dilemma
as a function of the degree of entanglement, as measured by sin2 γ, for the strategy
space S(1) (solid lines), and for S(2) (dashed line). For S(1) there are three regions
with different the Nash equilibria: Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ, Cˆ ′ ⊗ Dˆ and Dˆ ⊗ Cˆ ′, and Cˆ ′ ⊗ Cˆ ′. The
strategy Cˆ ′ is a cooperative strategy, becoming equivalent to Cˆ as γ → 0.
In the game of Chicken the strategy profile Dˆ′ ⊗ Dˆ′ results in mutual payoffs
of 3 sin2 γ. This is a NE provided sin2 γ ≥ 1
3
. Again there is some ambiguity
in the values of φ that can give rise to a NE, but this is unimportant for our
purposes 3 . Below this level, the classical strategy profiles Cˆ ⊗ Dˆ and Dˆ ⊗ Cˆ
are NE, as indicated in figure 2.
The reason for the behaviour of the new quantum equilibrium in both Prison-
ers’ Dilemma and Chicken results from the fact that Dˆ′ becomes equivalent to
Dˆ as γ → 0. In the former case this means that Dˆ′⊗Dˆ′ remains a NE for all γ
since it smoothly asymptotes to the classical NE of Dˆ⊗ Dˆ as γ → 0, while for
Chicken there is a switch to one of the classical NE Cˆ ⊗ Dˆ or Dˆ⊗ Cˆ for small
enough γ, since Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ is an undesirable result for both players. By compar-
ison, in the strategic space S(1), Cˆ ′ becomes equivalent to Cˆ as γ → 0 giving
rise to different classical-quantum thresholds since at some point defection will
be favoured by one or both players.
In the Battle of the Sexes, using the strategic space S(2) reverses the results
obtained for this game presented in the previous section. Now Oˆ ⊗ Oˆ is the
unique NE, where Oˆ = Mˆ (2)(0, φ) for arbitrary φ. The payoffs are
3 For completeness, we require φA + φB = pi/2 with both φ constrained by
1
3 sin2 γ + 1
< sin2 φ < 3 sin
2 γ
3 sin2 γ + 1
.
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✲✻
sin2 γ
〈$〉
1
3
1
1
3
4
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
Dˆ ⊗ Cˆ ′
Cˆ ⊗ Dˆ
Cˆ ′ ⊗ Cˆ ′
Dˆ′ ⊗ Dˆ′
defector❍
❍❍❨
✟✟✟✙
cooperator❅
❅
❅
❅❅■
❍❍
❍❍
❍❨
Fig. 2. The Nash equilibrium payoffs in a quantum version of the game of Chicken
as a function of the degree of entanglement, as measured by sin2 γ, for the strategy
space S(1) (solid lines), and for S(2) (dashed line). In the region sin2 γ < 13 , the Nash
equilibria in the first case are Cˆ ′⊗ Dˆ and Dˆ⊗ Cˆ ′, while for S(2) the Nash equilibria
are the classical ones of Cˆ⊗Dˆ and Dˆ⊗ Cˆ. The strategy Cˆ ′ is a cooperative strategy,
becoming equivalent to Cˆ as γ → 0.
〈$A〉 = 1 + sin2 γ; (22)
〈$B〉 = 2− sin2 γ,
the reverse of those in Eq. (13). In the case of both strategic spaces, the
addition of phase factors to only one diagonal of the matrix for the player
operatorsM (1) orM (2) favours one of the players by giving them the means to
respond to their opponent’s preferred choice while there is no such response
to their own desired selection. Consequently, one of the two classical NE is
eliminated.
4 Nash equilibria in N-player quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma
There is no standard accepted payoff matrix for N -player Prisoners’ Dilemma,
and for N > 3 it is little studied. However, we consider it of interest in the
quantum case since it gives us some information about N -partite entangle-
ment. Here an N -player mutual Prisoners’ Dilemma is considered rather than
the more frequently studied case of a series of two player interactions among
multiple players (e.g., see Ref. [22]). The requirements on the payoffs are that
• Defection is always the dominant strategy, that is, a player always receives
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more for defecting than for cooperating regardless of the actions of the other
players.
• A player is better off when more of the other players cooperate.
• When N − 2 players’ moves are fixed, the remaining 2 × 2 game is a two-
player Prisoners’ Dilemma.
These constraints are satisfied if cooperators and defectors receive, respec-
tively,
$C =


0, m = 1
3 + 4(m− 2), m > 1,
(23)
$D =5 + 4(m− 1)
where m is the number of players cooperating.
With this payoff structure and the strategy space S(1) we find the generaliza-
tion of the Cˆ ′⊗ Cˆ ′ equilibrium in the fully entangled game is Cˆ ⊗NN , where we
have introduced the notation
Cˆn ≡ Mˆ (1)(0, pi/n) =

 e
ipi/n 0
0 e−ipi/n

 . (24)
The strategy CˆN is cooperation (θ = 0) but with the addition of a phase
factor pi/N . For the strategy set S(1), all Dˆn ≡ Mˆ (1)(pi, pi/n) are equivalent to
Dˆ. To demonstrate that CˆN is a symmetric NE strategy, consider the payoff
to the last player, Larry, when he plays Mˆ (1)(θ, φ) while all the other players
continue with CˆN :
〈$L〉=$C...C cos2 θ
2
[
1 − 1
2
sin2 γ (1− cos(2φ− 2pi
N
))
]
(25)
+ $C...CD sin
2 θ
2
[
1 − 1
2
sin2 γ (1− cos 2pi
N
)
]
+ $D...DC sin
2 θ
2
sin2 γ (1− cos 2pi
N
)/2
+ $D...D cos
2 θ
2
sin2 γ (1− cos(2φ− 2pi
N
))/2.
Since $C...C > $D...D, Larry chooses φ = pi/N to maximize cos(2φ− 2piN ). Given
that the result D . . .DC yields Larry nothing,
〈$L〉 = $C...C cos2 θ
2
+ $C...CD sin
2 θ
2
[
1 − 1
2
sin2 γ (1− cos 2pi
N
)
]
. (26)
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Hence, Larry prefers θ = 0 provided
$C...C ≥ $C...CD [1 − 1
2
sin2 γ (1− cos 2pi
N
)]. (27)
Using Eq. (23) this reduces to
sin2 γ ≥ 4
(4N − 3)(1− cos 2pi
N
)
. (28)
Thus for sufficient high entanglement, Mˆ (1)(0, pi/N) ≡ CˆN is the best strategy
for Larry when the strategies of the other players are fixed. By symmetry
this demonstrates that Cˆ ⊗NN is a NE. When the entanglement parameter γ
drops below the level given by Eq. (28) this strategy profile is no longer a
NE. There is a new NE where one player selects the strategy Cˆ2 while all
the others defect. Again we demonstrate that this is a NE for a certain range
of entanglement by considering the payoff to a player that changes from their
equilibrium strategy. The payoff to Larry when he plays Mˆ (1)(θ, φ) while Alice
plays Cˆ2 and the remaining players defect is
〈$L〉=$CD...DC cos2 θ
2
[
1 − 1
2
sin2 γ (1 + cos(2φ)
]
(29)
+ $CD...D sin
2 θ
2
cos2 γ
+ $DC...C sin
2 θ
2
sin2 γ
+ $DC...CD cos
2 θ
2
sin2 γ (1 + cos(2φ))/2.
For Larry, $DC...CD > $CD...DC so he will choose φ = 0. Then θ = pi is his
preferred choice provided
sin2 γ≤ $CD...D − $CD...DC
$DC...CD + $CD...D − $CD...DC − $DC...C (30)
=
1
2
∀N,
where the last line is calculated using the payoffs in Eq. (23). So for γ ≤ pi/4
Larry does best by sticking to Dˆ. Similarly, if Alice plays Mˆ (1)(θ, φ) while all
the other players defect, her expected payoff is
〈$A〉=$CD...D [1 − 1
2
cos2
θ
2
sin2 γ (1− cos(2φ)] (31)
12
+ $DC...C cos
2 θ
2
sin2 γ (1− cos 2φ)/2
+ $D...D sin
2 θ
2
.
Since, for Alice, $DC...C > $CD...D, φ = pi/2 is Alice’s preferred value in the
range [0, pi/2]. Then she prefers θ = 0 provided
sin2 γ≥ $D...D − $CD...D
$DC...C − $CD...D (32)
=
1
4N − 3 .
Hence for 1/(4N − 3) ≤ sin2 γ ≤ 1/2 the strategy profile Cˆ2 ⊗ Dˆ⊗N−1 is
a NE. There are N equilibria of this form depending on who plays Cˆ2. Of
course, the existence of an equilibrium that “rational” players should select
avoids the question of how to arrive at such an equilibrium. The asymmetric
nature of this equilibrium would make reaching it extremely problematic in
practice. Where both the asymmetric equilibria and the mutual cooperation
equilibrium coexist, that is, for
4
(4N − 3)(1− cos 2pi
N
)
≤ sin2 γ ≤ 1
2
, (33)
mutual cooperation is better for all the players and, being symmetric, there
is no difficulty in reaching it. For γ < 1/(4N − 3) the only NE is the classi-
cal one of mutual defection. Figure 3 shows the NE payoffs for a four-player
quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma. The same structure applies for arbitrary N , the
main difference being that the line representing the cooperator’s payoff in the
intermediate region becomes steeper for increasing N .
Straight forward calculations similar to the above demonstrate that there are
no other NEs of the form Cˆ⊗mm ⊗ Dˆ⊗N−m, m = 0, 1, 2, . . ., though we have not
ruled out the existence of more complicated equilibria.
When the strategic space is chosen to be S(2) there is a symmetric NE analo-
gous to that present in the two-player game, Dˆ⊗N2N , where
Dˆn ≡ Mˆ (2)(pi, pi/n) =

 0 ie
ipi/n
ie−ipi/n 0

 . (34)
This is demonstrated to be a NE by showing that any unilateral variation in
strategy produces an inferior outcome for the varying player. Consider Larry’s
payoff when he plays Mˆ (2)(θ, φ) while the others continue with Dˆ2N :
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〈$L〉=$C...C sin2 θ
2
sin2 γ
[
1 + cos(2φ− pi
N
)
]
/2 (35)
+ $C...CD cos
2 θ
2
sin2 γ (1 + cos
pi
N
)/2
+ $D...DC cos
2 θ
2
[
1 − 1
2
sin2 γ (1 + cos
pi
N
)
]
+ $D...D sin
2 θ
2
[
1 − 1
2
sin2 γ (1 + cos(2φ− pi
N
))
]
.
Since $C...C > $D...D, Larry prefers φ = pi/(2N). Larry will then choose θ = pi
provided
$C...C sin
2 γ + $D...D ≥ $C...CD (1 + cos pi
N
). (36)
With the payoffs given by Eq. (23), Larry will select θ = pi for all γ, provided
N ≤ 8. For N ≥ 9 this NE begins to break down at large entanglements,
however, mutual Prisoners’ Dilemmas with such large numbers of players are
of little or no practical interest.
Although the payoff structure versus entanglement presents an interesting
picture with its different regions and bifurcations we would like to emphasize
again that the existence of these NE and the associated entanglement thresh-
olds are a function of the particular strategic space to which the players are
restricted.
5 Two-player quantum games with generalized two-parameter strate-
gies
The strategy spaces S(1) and S(2) can be generalized to
S
(1)
k =

 e
iφ cos θ
2
ieikφ sin θ
2
ie−ikφ sin θ
2
e−iφ cos θ
2

 , (37)
S
(2)
k =

 e
ikφ cos θ
2
ieiφ sin θ
2
ie−iφ sin θ
2
e−ikφ cos θ
2

 ,
where k ∈ [0, 1] is a fixed parameter. The two strategic spaces are distinct
except when k = 1. Setting k = 0 reduces S
(j)
k → S(j) for j = 1, 2.
Now consider a two-player quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma using each of the two
strategic spaces in Eq. (37). The strategic space S
(2)
k is uninteresting since it
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$all D
$CD...D
$all C
$C...CD
〈$〉
a b 0.5 1
sin2γ
(D2N)
⊗N
(CN)
⊗N
C2⊗D
⊗N-1
defectors
cooperator
D
⊗N
Fig. 3. The Nash equilibrium payoffs in a quantum version of a four-player Prisoners’
Dilemma as a function of the degree of entanglement, as measured by sin2 γ, for the
strategic space S(1) (solid lines), and S(2) (dashed line). In the case of S(1) there are
three regions with different Nash equilibria. The same structure holds for arbitrary
N , the main difference being that the gradient of the line for the cooperator’s
payoff in the intermediate region increases with N . The thresholds are, in general,
a = 1/(4N − 3) and b = 4/((4N − 3)(1 − cos 2piN )).
yields the same payoff versus entanglement structure as S(2): Cˆ ′ ⊗ Cˆ ′ is not a
NE for any γ, k while Dˆ′⊗ Dˆ′ is a NE for all γ, k with a payoff to each player
of 1 + 2 sin2 γ.
For S
(1)
k , Cˆ2 ≡ Cˆ ′ is a symmetric NE strategy with a payoff of $CC for a range
of γ and k. Consider Bob’s payoff when he counters Cˆ2 with Mˆ
(1)
k (pi, φ) for
some φ to be determined:
〈$B〉 = $CD (1− sin2 γ cos2 kφ) + $DC sin2 γ cos2 kφ. (38)
Bob maximizes this by selecting φ = pi/2. He prefers the resulting payoff over
$CC when
sin2 γ cos
kpi
2
<
$CD − $CC
$CD − $DC . (39)
All $ij are considered from Bob’s perspective, so using the payoffs of Eq. (6),
the right hand side of the above equation evaluates to 2
5
. The region satisfying
Eq. (39) is shown in figure 4.
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The strategy Dˆ4k ≡ Mˆ (1)k (pi, pi/(4k)), when played by both players, yields a
payoff
〈$〉 = $CC sin2 γ + $DD cos2 γ, (40)
that, for γ = pi/2, is the same as the cooperative payoff. If we maintain the
restriction that φ ≤ pi/2 this strategy can only be chosen when k ≥ 1
2
. The
region for which this is a NE can be deduced by considering the payoff to Bob
if he instead switches to Mˆ
(1)
k (0, φ):
〈$B〉 = $CD (1− sin 2kφ)/2 + $DC
[
1 − sin2 γ (1− sin 2kφ)/2
]
. (41)
For k ≥ 1
2
Bob maximizes this by setting φ = pi/(4k). Bob prefers the resulting
payoff over that of Eq. (40) when
sin2 γ >
$DD − $DC
$DD − $CC + 12$CD − 12$DC − 12($CD − $DC)
, (42)
which for the standard payoffs is never the case. That is, Bob cannot uni-
laterally improve upon Eq. (40), and by symmetry nor can Alice. Thus the
strategy profile Dˆ4k ⊗ Dˆ4k is a NE for k ≥ 12 . Following the same arguments,
Dˆ2 ⊗ Dˆ2 is a NE with
〈$〉 = $CC sin2 γ (1− cos 2kpi)/2 + $DD
[
1 − sin2 γ (1− cos 2kpi)/2
]
, (43)
when k < 1
2
. As k → 0 or γ → 0, Dˆ2 becomes equivalent to Dˆ. The region in
(γ, k) space, and the associated payoff, for which Dˆ2⊗ Dˆ2 is a NE is indicated
in figure 4. Similarly, the regions for which Cˆ2⊗Dˆ2 and Dˆ2⊗Cˆ2 are NE can be
determined. The payoffs and the region of applicability of these asymmetric
NE are also indicated in figure 4. The defector gets the greater payoff.
We observe that by specifying the strategic space through the parameter k,
the presence of Nash equilibria and, in general, the associated payoffs can be
altered.
6 Conclusion
We have extended the examination of two-parameter quantum strategies in the
Eisert protocol of quantum games. In the original form presented by Eisert at
al. and subsequently taken up by a number of other authors we have presented
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0.4
0.2
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sin  (kpi/2)2
 
1
2
3
4
$〈 〉
 2        2C     C
 2        2D     D
 2        2C     D
 4k        4k
D      D
⊗
⊗
⊗
⊗
Fig. 4. The surfaces show the payoff to both players at the Nash equilibria for a
two-player quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma using the strategy space S
(1)
k , as a func-
tion of the entanglement and the strategy space parameter k. The strategy profile
Dˆ4k⊗ Dˆ4k is a Nash equilibrium for k ≥ 12 , with the surface folding at k = 12 , below
which the equilibrium is Dˆ2 ⊗ Dˆ2. The strategy profile Cˆ2 ⊗ Cˆ2 has a payoff of
three but is only a Nash equilibrium for sin2 γ cos2 kpi2 ≥ 25 . There is a small region
where there is an asymmetric Nash equilibrium of Cˆ2 ⊗ Dˆ2 or Dˆ2 ⊗ Cˆ2. Here the
defector gets a payoff of between 3 and 4, while the cooperator must be satisfied
with between 1 and 2.
results for the Nash equilibrium as a function of the entanglement parameter
for the games of Chicken and the Battle of the Sexes, analogous to the results
previously published for Prisoners’ Dilemma. The asymmetry of the (unique)
Nash equilibrium payoffs in Battle of the Sexes already raises alarm bells
about the suitability of selecting this strategic space. By instead choosing an
equivalent two-parameter strategic space where the phase factors are arranged
differently, we show that different Nash equilibria can arise, with different
payoffs and different classical-quantum thresholds.
We generalize these results in two ways: by examining an N -player quantum
Prisoners’ Dilemma and by considering an extension of the two-parameter
strategies using an additional fixed parameter. TheN -player Prisoners’ Dilemma
shows a similar, though more complex, structure in the Nash equilibrium pay-
offs to the two-player case. For the generalized two-parameter strategies, the
position of any entanglement thresholds between regions of differing Nash equi-
libria and the associated payoffs depend in most cases upon the (arbitrary)
17
parameter used in generalizing the strategy space.
These results indicate that the new equilibria are simply artifacts of the choice
of strategic space, that is, the particular slice of the space of unitary operators
to which the players are restricted and, in the absence of a physical justification
for this restriction, tell us nothing significant about the underlying game.
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